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Largely written by a distinguished group of labour lawyers, the Australian Charter of 
Employment Rights (AIER, 2007) comprising ten ‘rights’ and a justificatory text was 
intended to be an alternative to the Coalition Government’s Workchoices laws. The 
political context, coming weeks before the election, was evident in the measured 
intention to be ‘employer friendly’. The question is whether the Charter maps out a 
desirable, feasible framework in the globalisation era, in which labour market flexibility, 
outsourcing, casualisation and privatisation of social policy are the pervasive trends. 
 
This article accepts that the Charter is an articulate defence of the social democratic 
system, which should be widely debated. However, although its values are progressive, it 
is paternalistic and tinged with nostalgia for a world dominated by manufacturing and 
stable full-time jobs, when the extension of social rights comprised progressive politics. 
The article is a plea to those seeking an alternative to Workchoices to be less defensive. 
While it is easy to criticise the ‘Howard’ laws, it is neither realistic nor desirable to return 
to the labourist model.   
 
The Worker 
At the heart of the matter is ‘the worker’, defined laboriously in a sentence of no fewer 
than 236 words as ‘the employee’ (AIER, 2007: 125-126). This definitional conundrum 
reflects a contemporary dilemma.  
 
In the context of globalisation, the standard employment relationship (SER) is crumbling 
amidst a widening diversity of work statuses. From a policy viewpoint, one could extend 
the notion of employee, as this Charter does, to try to encompass ambivalent statuses. Or 
one could recognise the diversity of work-life trajectories and address specific issues 
confronting the various groups in their dealings and contractual relationships. 
 
Labour parties have a predicament. They came into existence not to overthrow capitalism 
but to regulate it so as to make the SER not only the norm but a sphere of ‘decent’ and 
‘fair’ practice. Throughout the 20th century, the social democratic model linked social 
entitlements – so-called ‘rights’ – to the performance of labour and the willingness to 
perform it. 
  
Part of the deal – the social compact – was that social rights for employees would be 
extended in return for the state and worker representatives supporting the managerial 
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right to manage and right to retain profits. Unions had a compromised role, being 
institutionalised as protectors of the compact and as voice of employees wishing to obtain 
more labour-based entitlements. Social rights outside the workplace were exchanged for 
curtailment of work rights within it (Standing, 2002). 
 
For many years, this was progressive. There was redistribution from capital to labour in 
gaining social rights, such as contingency-based social security, and enterprise-based 
benefits, such as defined-benefit pensions and healthcare insurance. But the model had 
flaws that this Charter and its UK predecessor (Ewing and Hendy, 2002) fail to 
overcome. It treats the labour market as a matter of vulnerable employees facing 
powerful employers, the former deemed to need protection, the latter the ‘right’ to expect 
employees to show loyalty and a duty to obey. 
 
This Charter seeks to revive the resultant labourist model. Accordingly, there is no 
consideration of alternatives to industrial unionism. The model also discounts work done 
by more people for more time than any other, namely care work. This writer does not 
believe it is desirable to ignore some forms of work in a strategy of work rights. 
Nevertheless, let us consider the Charter on its own terms. 
  
Workers are defined as (i) employees, (ii) dependent contractors, and (iii) others whose 
contracts seek to conceal real employment (p.118). The authors accept that the criterion 
of ‘control’ used to determine employment has given way to a ‘multi-factor test’ (p.119) 
relevant to triangular relationships, dependent contractors and ‘atypical’ employment. 
But then they run into difficulties.  
 
Their solution is to define the worker as someone satisfying one necessary condition and 
at least two from a menu of six others. The necessary condition is that the person must 
not be engaged in ‘entrepreneurial activity’. So, someone providing a service to ‘a range 
of customers’ is not a worker. It is unclear where the Charter would place single-person 
producers supplying services to a few clients. If covered by common law and competition 
policy, they would have little chance of being allowed to bargain collectively. Yet many 
would have a vulnerable position vis-à-vis client producers. And many outworkers, 
including home-based workers, would not satisfy the necessary condition, since they 
work for several employers and take risks that make them candidates for ‘entrepreneurial’ 
status.  
 
If the objective is to identify the vulnerable, then let us recognise that many excluded 
from worker status on the grounds that they are ‘independent contractors’ are among the 
most vulnerable of all.                                            
 
The Employer 
The Charter gives less attention to defining ‘the employer’, who emerges as a benevolent 
power with strong rights and vague ‘obligations’. The Charter recognises two awkward 
phenomena – independent contractors and triangular employment. But the independent 
provider of services would sit uneasily between having the rights and duties of an 
employer and the rights and duties of a worker, thus having no rights at all. As for the 
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triangular relationship, lawyers struggle to identify the true employer when brokers or 
employment agencies are involved. For those in such situations, the crucial concerns 
would be transparency, accountability and security.   
 
The Charter should be challenged on its paternalistic bias. IR sages, such as Sumner 
Slichter (1929), understood the dangers. Why, for example, should employers have an 
obligation to provide training for those who work for them, or provide opportunity for 
career progression? An alternative view is that employers should draw up transparent 
employment contracts and then adhere to the law. The rights of independent contractors 
should be the same as for those designated as workers, including the right to free 
association and to free collective bargaining.        
 
Are there Employment Rights? 
The Charter claims employment rights stem from three sources – international 
instruments, primarily ILO Conventions and human rights declarations, ‘values’ that have 
influenced Australia’s constitutional and institutional history, and common law. This 
provides a large menu from which to choose. How to prioritise is not explained, although 
there are tantalising references to the ‘egalitarian principle’, ‘classical contract theory’ 
and ‘the right to work’. 
 
The book exhorts us to go ‘back to basics’. Well, it is usually accepted that human rights 
are universal, equal and indivisible. Rights are ethical demands for certain freedoms, and 
are about forging full freedom, in which Isaiah Berlin’s negative liberty (freedom from) 
and positive liberty (freedom to) are given equal weight (Berlin, 1958). An essential 
freedom is the ability to say “No!” It is important to differentiate between legal and claim 
rights. The latter are rights which policy and institutional change should move steadily 
towards; as such, they provide criteria by which to evaluate reforms. Economic and social 
rights (‘second generation’ rights) are claim rights. 
 
In this context, it is hard to know what employment rights could mean. Should someone 
in employment have rights that others should not have? Does everybody who is working 
have the same rights?  
 
The Charter refers to ILO Conventions as setting obligations on Australian governments. 
As of 2007, the ILO had adopted 188 Conventions and 199 Recommendations. The 
former establish obligations on governments if the country has ratified them. 
Unfortunately, no country has ratified anything like all the Conventions or subscribed to 
all the Recommendations (which do not involve binding obligations). And efforts to 
reach ‘tripartite’ agreement on Conventions attempting to deal with more flexible labour 
markets have been unsuccessful.   
 
In particular, the Homework Convention of 1996 has been ratified by just four countries, 
Australia not being one of them. And the tortuous attempt to establish a Convention on 
Contract Labour in the mid-1990s failed dismally. In other words, there are no 
established international ‘rights’ covering two growing forms of employment in the 
Global Transformation.  
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Given the dubious notion of employment rights, one might think in terms of worker 
rights. This would run into similar difficulties, since it would still involve an arbitrary 
distinction between workers and non-workers. A better alternative is to consider work 
rights. This would not exclude anybody, since everybody physically and mentally 
capable of a normal life performs activities that could be regarded as work. What would 
one wish to include in a Charter of Work Rights?  
     
Work as Freedom and Security 
Work rights should be about advancing freedom in the sphere of work. This must include 
the right to the commons, and the right to control one’s time and space in which to work. 
Work freedom encompasses access to and control of seven aspects of work – own labour 
power, labour (time), skill development, means of production, raw materials, output, and 
the proceeds of the output. A rights agenda should consider how to ensure a maximum 
feasible combination of these freedoms, subject to the constraints of equity, dynamic 
efficiency and the Kantian principle of doing-no-harm-to-others.  
 
This leads to the complex idea of security. There are substantive and instrumental reasons 
for a claim right to basic economic security (Standing, 2002). The challenge lies in 
determining what types of security are paramount, what level of security is optimum and 
what forms of security might be regarded as tradable rights (those one might do without 
if some other right was strengthened).  
 
The Charter refers to several forms of security, but not all. It states that workers should 
have voice in connection with ‘job security’ (AIER, 2007: 50) and a chapter is devoted to 
unfair dismissal. But it mixes up employment security and job security, ignoring the latter 
altogether. Having a secure job within an enterprise, or a secure occupation, is not the 
same as having a long-term employment contract or tolerable dismissal procedures.  
 
Both employment and job security are tradable rights. If one wishes to have control over 
one’s work, and develop a lifetime of satisfying work, the crucial needs are basic income 
security and representation security. Only with the assurance of a means of survival, 
without fear and without having to undertake demeaning tasks to obtain it, could 
someone make rational choices. That would give meaning to the right to work. However, 
only with individual and collective Voice security could income security be maintained. 
One without the other would be inadequate.       
 
The ‘Right to Work’ 
The authors note without explanation that the ‘right to work’, while covered in Chapter 
13, is not included in the Charter because it is a ‘societal right’ (AIER, 2007: 8). Chapter 
13 begins by recalling Article 23 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights stating 
that everybody has a right ‘to free choice of employment’. It gives a Keynesian 
interpretation of the trade-off between inflation and unemployment, and claims there is 
‘widespread consensus among economists about policies’ to deal with 
unemployment, adding that the ‘only serious disagreements are value laden ones 
about how much should be spent’ (AIER, 2007: 142, emphasis added).  
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The Chicago school of law-and-economics has long argued that the model favoured in 
this Charter generates market distortions that raise unemployment. Its response has been 
to dismantle protective regulations and curb unions, so as to produce ‘market clearing 
wages’. To say there is consensus must mean that no ‘serious’ economists adhere to that 
position or that all do so. This writer does not subscribe to the Chicago school. However, 
to imagine that the world is not being driven by economists, financial agencies and 
policymakers who do, is to indulge in wishful thinking. 
 
Chapter 13 also fails to rescue the Charter from an omission, by not dealing with 
Australia’s rush to workfare, as a policy for dealing with unemployment and the moral 
and immoral hazards associated with means-testing, poverty traps and unemployment 
traps in flexible labour markets. The trend is towards coercing the unemployed and others 
to take low-level jobs, on pain of having benefits cut. The right to ‘freely chosen 
employment’ is dishonoured in this paternalistic strategy. Moreover, the effects on 
working conditions of those in low-level jobs of having pressure from a cowed group can 
hardly be beneficial.  
 
In sum, the rights of those in employment depend as much on the state’s attitude to the 
unemployed as on the state’s policy on, say, dismissal procedures. The Charter’s 
omission is inadmissible and, one suspects, expedient.   
                 
Confronting Inequality? 
Although the Charter mentions inequality, it is coy about what to do. Thus it asserts, 
reasonably, ‘Inequality and subordination are dysfunctional characteristics of human 
relationships that breed discontent in the workplace’ (AIER, 2007: 7). It then states that 
‘equality of treatment’ does not mean ‘parity between worker and employer’ but ‘a fair 
exchange’. This is confusing.  
 
The authors seem to have in mind a model of employment equity, not equality. They 
believe in subordination. Having referred to a ‘fair go all round’ as part of Australian 
‘egalitarian democracy’ (p.13), they sign up to ‘the doctrine of managerial prerogative 
(managers’ inherent and unquestioned right to manage)’ (AIER, 2007: 22), adding, in 
bold, ‘Every employer has the right to expect that workers will cooperate’ (AIER, 2007: 
42). There is no caveat.  
 
Inequality in Australia has been growing. The functional distribution of income is 
widening, with more income going to capital (Peetz, 2007). If the boss paid himself a 
million dollars a year and shopfloor workers $20,000, would the latter be ‘unfair’ if they 
did not cooperate? Is there no worker’s right to a ‘fair’ share? Or is such a delicate 
subject outside the Charter’s remit? Wage differentials are widening. The shrinking 
gender-based wage inequality has been reversed. The distributions of enterprise benefits 
and state benefits are becoming more regressive. 
 
These are contributing to a global class fragmentation. This reflects differentiation in 
forms of income and forms of social rights and security. In brief, at the top is a 
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grotesquely affluent tiny elite, below whom is a salariat, privileged through employment 
security, income security and benefits covering most forms of risk. Below them are 
proficians, usually earning high incomes but with self-chosen employment insecurity.  
 
The Charter would be of little interest to those top strata. Below them come core workers, 
the old working class. The Charter is for them. They are mostly in the SER, have access 
to unions, some employment security and some income security. But they are dwindling 
as a social force. Below them is what should be called the precariat. This is the group to 
which a Charter of work rights should be primarily addressed. They have little income 
security, with no assured entitlement to state or enterprise benefits, and little employment 
security, or other forms of security (labour market, work, skill, occupational or 
representation). Below the precariat come the unemployed and a lumpenised detached 
group who wander the streets. They all count.    
 
Only if we have some image of the class character of society can we have a vision of 
work rights and devise a strategy for responding to today’s socio-economic ruptures. 
Doing so, we may find that emerging generations of workers are aspiring to a different 
package of rights than could be conveyed by the old industrial model.           
 
The Dignity of Work 
Chapter 2 is an interesting call for ‘work with dignity’. But it is unclear how one can have 
a right to dignity. Surely, one obtains dignity not from being in employment, but from the 
work one does and the community in which one does it.  
 
The chapter cites the ILO Philadelphia Declaration’s reference to ‘freedom’ and 
‘economic security’, but does not deal with them. Instead, after mentioning the slogan of 
‘decent work’, it claims that ‘dignity at work’ is about ‘the employment relationship’ 
(AIER, 2007: 21), while ‘dignity of work’ seems to be about job design. The incredibly 
brief section on the latter does not consider how workers themselves could develop 
dignified work. It is paternalistic. All we have is an assertion, ‘The right to dignity of 
work demands that jobs be designed with proper regard to [social and humanitarian] 
considerations’ (p.25). One is not told how this could be ensured, let alone how it sits 
with the right of employers to manage as they see fit.        
 
The section adds that there should be a right for ‘equal opportunity for everyone to be 
promoted’, citing the UN’s 1966 Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
which here is actually referring to discrimination. One cannot see employers providing 
promotion opportunities for everybody. And it is wishful thinking to imagine it is in 
every employer’s interests to ‘maximise the opportunities for training, development and 
promotion’ (AIER, 2007: 25). Most could neither afford nor benefit from providing 
everybody who works for them with such opportunities. However, it is not clear that 
employers should be social policy agents. This smacks of old-style corporate paternalism. 






Most worrying of all is the absence of discussion of work as occupation. What we do is 
more important than for whom we do it. Most people in reasonable health want to spend 
their lives working to better themselves and their families. This is what occupations are 
about. There is nothing on occupations in the book, beyond a remark that unions should 
be free to pursue workers’ ‘occupational interests’ (AIER, 2007: 59). There is no 
discussion of occupational associations or regulation.  
 
If there is any work right, it must be the right to do the work we wish, subject to our 
abilities and to ensuring that it does not harm others. This should be at the heart of a 
Charter. 
 
We should develop an agenda for occupational rights and a system of occupational 
regulation, the term for the legal and institutional mechanisms used to guide 
combinations of tasks that have come to be called occupations. What system of 
occupational regulation would promote work rights? Adam Smith (1776: 225) believed 
there should be no restrictions on workers practising whatever they chose. Modern and 
ancient legislators around the world have not agreed. The right to practise is curtailed in 
Australia in many ways. 
 
First, legislators have wished to ensure that freedom of association should not be 
interpreted too literally. If a group doing a similar type of work form an association to set 
their own standards, qualification requirements and remuneration scales, that can be seen 
as in contravention of competition policy. So, with some exceptions (e.g., lawyers), the 
state has tended to regulate, and even block the formation of, professional bodies. 
 
Second, again in the ostensible interest of ‘consumers’ and ‘competition’, governments 
have resorted to occupational licensing, standard setting, accreditation tests, rules of 
disbarment and mandatory codes of practice. In Australia, many groups have requested 
state governments for a licence to operate as a group. Besides well-known professions, 
they have included travel agents, opticians, martial arts promoters, electrical contractors, 
mechanics, beauticians and insurance agents (Moore and Tarr, 1989). 
  
The Charter is silent on all this. Its authors could not claim it is a marginal issue. In 
Australia, as in the USA, more workers are encompassed by occupational regulation than 
by collective agreements. And that will continue.  
 
Is occupational licensing justifiable in terms of rights? The claim is that it helps protect 
the consumer, who can anticipate a reliable service. In the case of medical treatment, that 
can be reassuring. Yet critics have swarmed over that claim (e.g., Summers, 2007; 
Kleiner, 2000). Do not look to this Charter for a resolution of the argument, or even 
awareness of it.  
 
Occupational licensing is growing fast. By the 1980s, over 800 occupations in the USA 
required a licence; that may be over 1,000 now (Kleiner, 2006). And more associations 
are emerging to protect occupations. They may favour licensing because it can keep up 
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their prices and, in pursuit of that, impose artificially high entry standards. And they can 
persuade governments to pass laws requiring workers wishing to join the occupation to 
achieve qualifications only through specified avenues. Whose rights count? 
 
Alongside licensing is negative occupational licensing, common in Australia as 
elsewhere, by which a person can be disqualified by contravening some rule or standard 
of competence. From a rights perspective, we should ask what behaviour could justify 
someone being locked out of his chosen work and what authority should have the right to 
make that decision. 
    
Occupational licensing and negative licensing by the state are just two means by which 
the right to work is controlled. Throughout history, groups have used self-regulation to 
achieve the same purpose. A Charter of work rights should take a position on what is 
appropriate. 
             
For instance, a typical rule is that someone can only practise if he or she has done so 
within a specified period – a recency of practice test.2 How would a person recover the 
right to practise? At the very least, work rights should balance the need to ensure respect 
for standards with the right to work, for example, by requiring those wishing to renew 
work to undergo refresher courses. A rights-based charter should propose ways of 
resolving conflicting objectives – reassurance for consumers and the right to practise. 
 
Another issue is what should be called occupational oppression. Two occupations that 
have suffered from oppression are midwives and alternative medicine practitioners, 
particularly in the USA. In both cases, regulations at the behest of one powerful group 
(doctors) have blocked other groups from practising. 
 
There are many aspects of occupations that should be in a Charter of Work Rights, and it 
is to be hoped that the Australian IR community will help forge it. It should cover the 
right to enter an occupation, the right to practise and the right to mobility, across 
geographical boundaries and within the occupation itself.       
   
‘Workplace Democracy’ 
The tantalisingly short chapter on workplace democracy (eight pages) begins by stating 
that ‘workers have the right to play a part in decisions that fundamentally affect them in 
the workplace’ (AIER, 2007: 44). What does ‘play a part’ mean?  
 
If one lauds the duty to obey an employer and his ‘unquestioned’ right to manage, then 
playing a part must be limited. It is not much use having a say if the employer can retort, 
‘Tough, mate.’ A right must be meaningful, and there must be protection against 
retribution, with consequences if the right is abused. Apparently, workers would have 
‘the right to express their views’ and play an ‘advisory role’ (AIER, 2007: 51). This is 
hardly a rights strategy. Moreover, apparently democracy ‘involves a rejection of 
adversarial workplace relations’ (AIER, 2007: 44). This is an employer’s nirvana. 
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 Thus, Australian states operate Physiotherapy Acts that have diverse ‘recency of practise’ requirements. 
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To place faith in ‘a partnership-oriented approach (rather than a merely adversarial 
approach)’ (AIER, 2007: 49) is platitudinous unless one states what form of partnership 
is being advocated. It is unclear whether the authors believe workers and employers 
should have equal voting rights. Given their commitment to the right of employers to 
manage and the worker’s duty to obey and show loyalty, the partnership sounds like an 
old-fashioned marriage. Unless the workers’ Voice could be raised, adversarially if 
necessary, gestures about partnership are not worth much. 
 
Workplace democracy should surely be about the distribution of power, income and 
assets, and such matters as technological change and job design. While workers need 
information, democracy is having the capacity to do something with it. Does the Charter 
team believe there should be a democratic right to shape wage differentials, or the 
distribution of profits? If one omits such issues in a plea for workplace democracy one is 
omitting primary features of the Global Transformation. 
 
This leads to the Charter’s position on ‘the right of free association’ (AIER, 2007: 54), 
which is couched in terms that conjure up an earlier age. It is all about ‘union 
membership’ and bargaining between unions and employers. Two statements worried this 
reader. One is that ‘no job or employment benefit should be offered on the condition that 
the worker not be a union member’ (AIER, 2007: 56). The Charter implies that a benefit 
conditional on being a union member would be acceptable. This has helped keep up 
unionisation in Scandinavia. Where does the Charter team stand? 
 
The second statement is that unions should be allowed to campaign on all sorts of issues 
‘on behalf of members’ (AIER, 2007: 60), including ‘the election of a political party’. 
Think of the counter-factual. Suppose one joins a union to be represented in bargaining 
with employers, and then the union leadership decides to support a right-wing political 
party.  
 
The claims recall a statement made by G.D.H. Cole (1920: 95) that we need as many 
interest associations as we have interests to represent. There is no good reason for a 
blanket right for unions. Ironically, the proposed right for unions to do all the activities 
listed would be counter to their long-term appeal, since potential members could be put 
off by their positions on external matters. 
 
Since unions are shrinking, calling for a union-based model risks irrelevance. Meanwhile, 
a growing number of people belong to (sometimes obligatory) occupational bodies. A 
framework for occupational democracy has yet to be laid out, although US libertarian 
institutes call for complete self-regulation, which will not happen. 
 
Occupational associations vary from informational exchange societies to powerful bodies 
determining everything from right of entry to pay scales and disbarment. Given that 
lawyers operate a comprehensive one, it is strange that the Charter did not engage with 
the issues. Often, such bodies do not bargain directly with employers. Often, they 
advance some ‘rights’ of members, but curb others. Often, they determine gainers and 
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losers within an occupational community, determine ‘the right to practise’ and determine 
with whom members can work.        
 
If the sphere of democracy is unclear, so too is the workplace. The term ‘workplace 
democracy’ needs unpackaging since a growing number of people work in multiple 
workplaces. At the heart of labour law is the physical workplace, the factory, mine or 
office. These days, for many people this workplace may be the least fixed. A second 
workplace is the home, to where an increasing number take work, even if they have a 
physical workplace as well.  
 
A third workplace, which may be the most fixed, psychologically or aspirationally, is our 
craft or profession, which may have several layers, from a local community, responsible 
for overseeing local performance, to an international association with powerful regulatory 
functions. This occupational workplace is a mini-society, since it may embrace functions 
that are often considered the sphere of the state, from the establishment and monitoring of 
qualifications to determination of entitlement to social protection. As with states, 
occupations vary in the comprehensiveness of their policies. But one cannot deny they 
have a growing role in shaping work in modern societies.  
 
Thus what happens in the physical workplace may be the least important part of a 
person’s work, scarcely worth making the cornerstone of a Charter. For a growing 
number of people, the occupational workplace is more important than the office or 
shopfloor where one happens to be working at the moment. There is a need for 
occupational democracy as part of occupational rights.
3
 
                          
Concluding Reflections 
We need a charter of work rights, in which the imagination focuses on the content of 
work. That must be linked to a strategy for economic rights. Work comprises all the 




Progressives favouring a society in which work can flourish in freedom should make a 
leap. Contrary to what has been said ad nauseam, labour is a commodity. The ultimate 
work right is that the worker should not be. It is sensible for individuals to enter 
relationships in which they supply a commodity (labour) for a price (wage) and in which 
they accept direction from the purchaser (employer). But in a good society, everybody 
should have economic rights that would prevent them from becoming commodified.     
 
A Charter for Work Rights for the 21
st
 century could build on the Charter of Economic 
Security presented in an ILO report (2004). It should set an agenda for occupational 
rights and occupational citizenship. Everybody is a worker and should be enabled to 
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 This should lead us to reconsider guilds, cooperatives and community unionism. These may provide a 
route to dignified work, but if left as vehicles of self-regulation, they would be subject to regulatory capture 
and distributional failure. Regulatory capture was the first issue in a paper by the Treasury as part of the 
National Competition Policy Reform (Parker et al, 1997).  
4
 Pigou’s well-known quip reminds us of the limits of labourism (Pigou, 1920: 32). He noted that if he 
hired a housekeeper, national income would rise, whereas if he married her, national income would fall. 
Unpaid care and community work should be treated as work just as much as the paid equivalent.   
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combine paid and unpaid forms of work in ways they want. By disregarding work that is 
not employment and by disregarding occupations, this Charter has missed an opportunity 
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